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DUTY AT ALL COSTS
George M. Clifford III
In his Dereliction of Duty, H. R. McMaster describes the Joint Chiefs of Staff dur-ing Lyndon Johnson’s presidency as the “five silent men” who cooperated with
Johnson in deceit instead of speaking the truth about what was happening in
Vietnam. McMaster proffers several explanations as to why these officers re-
mained silent: the unwritten code of the military professional to stay out of politics;
loyalty to their commander in chief; loyalty to their services; and the belief that they
could achieve more good on active duty than by retiring and speaking out.1
One of President Johnson’s “five silent men,” General Harold K. Johnson,
Army Chief of Staff from July 1964 to July 1968, after his retirement engaged in
considerable self-examination about his decision to remain on active duty in
spite of his grave objections to the prosecution of the Vietnam War:
I remember the day I was ready to go over to the Oval Office and give my four stars
to the President and tell him, “You have refused to tell the country they cannot fight
a war without mobilization; you have required me to send men into battle with little
hope of their ultimate victory; and you have forced us in the military to violate almost
every one of the principles of war in Vietnam. Therefore, I resign and will hold a
press conference after I walk out of your door.”2
The senior U.S. commander in Vietnam for much
of that time was General William Westmoreland, who
insisted on large-unit “search and destroy” missions.
Johnson’s professional judgment, supported by a major
Army study, was that only an intensified, classic counter-
insurgency response would succeed against Vietcong
and North Vietnamese attacks. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
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(JCS) refused to support General Johnson, fearful of interfering with a field
commander’s prerogatives. History shows that General Westmoreland’s tactics
were wrong. General Johnson never had his confrontation with Nixon, con-
vinced that resigning would achieve little or nothing, generating a brief flurry of
media attention but no policy change. However, near the end of his life General
Johnson came to regret that decision.3
More recently, Lieutenant General Gregory Newbold, USMC (Ret.), attracted
much media attention with an April 2006 Time magazine column that called for
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s resignation.4 General Newbold also as-
sessed his own performance as the operations director for the Joint Staff:
After 9/11, I was a witness and therefore a party to the actions that led us to the inva-
sion of Iraq—an unnecessary war. Inside the military family, I made no secret of my
view that the zealots’ rationale for war made no sense. And I think I was outspoken
enough to make those senior to me uncomfortable. But I now regret that I did not
more openly challenge those who were determined to invade a country whose actions
were peripheral to the real threat—al-Qaeda.5
Not only did Newbold object to the war in principle, but he believed that the
planning for it had been seriously deficient:
What we are living with now is the consequences of successive policy failures. Some
of the missteps include: the distortion of intelligence in the buildup to the war,
McNamara-like micromanagement that kept our forces from having enough re-
sources to do the job, the failure to retain and reconstitute the Iraqi military in time
to help quell civil disorder, the initial denial that an insurgency was the heart of the
opposition to occupation, alienation of allies who could have helped in a more ro-
bust way to rebuild Iraq, and the continuing failure of the other agencies of our gov-
ernment to commit assets to the same degree as the Defense Department.6
In 2002 Lieutenant General Newbold had appeared a likely candidate to be
the next Commandant of the Marine Corps. He instead chose to retire, in part
because of his opposition to the war. He waited until 2006 to make his views
about the Iraq war and its planning public.
General Newbold’s comments and actions, like those of General Johnson,
pose two ethical issues. First, when, if ever, should an officer request to depart in
protest because of policy objections?7 Second, when, if ever, should an officer
who has departed because of policy objections speak publicly about those objec-
tions? This article’s three sections develop a model for American military offi-
cers to use in answering those questions. The first section identifies the four
categories of moral situations that an officer who has policy objections can face.
The second section examines moral factors relevant to deciding whether to de-
part in protest. The third section employs those moral factors to evaluate
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whether an officer should depart in protest with respect to each of the four cate-
gories of moral situations. Finally, the article’s conclusion illustrates the model’s
utility by reviewing the decisions of Generals Johnson and Newbold.
The context of General Newbold’s decisions makes clear how his resignation
and General Johnson’s choice not to resign dovetail to provide appropriate case
studies for the moral questions outlined above. General Newbold was not alone
in publicly calling for Secretary Rumsfeld’s resignation. Other retired generals
who did so include: Army major general Paul Eaton, responsible for training
Iraqi security forces in the year after Baghdad fell; Marine general Anthony C.
Zinni, previously commander of Central Command, responsible for operations
in the Middle East; and Army major general John Batiste, commanding general
of the 1st Infantry Division in Iraq during 2004–2005.8 Many of the retired gen-
erals critical of Rumsfeld have cited McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty, a book now
widely regarded by military officers as essential professional reading, as partial
justification for their speaking out.9
A few officers—among them a former Army Chief of Staff, General Eric
Shinseki; the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Michael W. Hagee; and Central
Command’s General John Abizaid—have reportedly sought to influence policy
from within the institution by strongly defending their opinions while on active
duty.10 If so, they emulated President Johnson’s “five silent men,” who, at least in
part, believed that they could accomplish more good by remaining in post than
they could achieve by resigning. From this perspective, General Johnson’s ex
post facto lamentations, not his actions, were wrong.
The high profile of those involved, their positions of significant leadership
within the Department of Defense, the diversity of moral choices they made, and
the serious issues involved combine to make the decisions of Generals Johnson
and Newbold timely and interesting. McMaster’s influential book, a recent arti-
cle in this journal challenging some of his central conclusions, and the continu-
ing relevance of these moral issues for officers in and out of combat lend
additional impetus to examining protest departures through an ethical lens.11
Military ethicists and others have largely ignored the issue of protest departures.
Martin Cook is a notable exception; he has briefly discussed the subject, but even
he did not offer a detailed analysis or any suggestions as to when departing in
protest might be appropriate.12 This lack of substantive moral discourse suggests
a need to broaden the moral development of officers to include this topic.
CATEGORIES OF MORAL SITUATIONS
Officers face four different categories of moral situations when assigned respon-
sibilities they believe morally wrong.13 These options constitute a spectrum best
viewed as progressing from least to most morally problematic:
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• An assigned responsibility the officer can perform with minimal moral
discomfort
• An assigned responsibility the officer can perform only with substantial
moral discomfort
• An assigned responsibility the officer can perform only at the cost of
significantly compromising his or her moral standards
• An assigned responsibility the officer must not perform.
In the first category, at one extreme of that fourfold taxonomy, the moral
component of an issue lacks sufficient gravity or import to evoke substantial
moral reflection or debate. For example, an officer may disagree with the uni-
form prescribed for a special event. The officer may have good reasons for dis-
agreeing—for instance, legitimate concern about the comfort of personnel
involved or projected impact on public relations. Both reasons have moral di-
mensions. Officers have an obligation to the well-being of assigned personnel.
Officers have a similar obligation to maintain the institution’s health, an obliga-
tion that good relations with the public (voters and taxpayers) support. Yet no
officer should choose to depart over this issue. Nobody’s life, or even health, ap-
pears at risk. No one must act illegally or, probably, contravene any regulations
or instructions. Long-term consequences, if any, seem minimal.
This exemplifies the type of assigned responsibility about which officers may
have moral disagreements but that nonetheless they should be able to perform
with minimal moral discomfort. Subordinates and seniors, all individuals of
good will and high moral standards but with different vantage points, levels of
experience, and responsibilities, will frequently reach different conclusions
about such issues.14 Officers of all grades routinely deal with them.
At the other extreme of the spectrum lies the fourth category, egregious ille-
gal orders, such as to commit what international or U.S. law classifies as war
crimes. The substantive consequences of complying with such an order are so
great than an officer has no ethical choice other than to refuse to obey. Since
Vietnam, most discussions of what an officer should do when confronted with
an order or assignment with which the officer morally disagrees have focused
exclusively on this type of situation.15
Few U.S. military officers will face a moral decision in this category.16 The
laws governing the American military cohere well with most major ethical sys-
tems.17 (Court proceedings or other investigations may prove that orders gov-
erning treatment of enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib in
Iraq, and elsewhere were recent exceptions to that generalization.)18 The officers
most likely to face a moral decision in this category are in grades O1 through
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O6—that is, second lieutenants or ensigns through colonels or Navy captains,
officers leading ground units or serving in aircrews or on board vessels at sea.
Lieutenant William Calley alleged that his commander, Captain Ernest L. Medina,
ordered the My Lai massacre. Had that allegation been proven, Captain Medina’s
order to Lieutenant Calley would have belonged to this fourth category, an order
that Calley should have refused to obey. Only when widespread, systemic moral
breakdown occurs, as in Nazi Germany, are flag and general officers likely to
confront this category of moral decision.
The Iraq conflict has produced an example of an officer believing that by per-
forming his assigned responsibility, deploying to Iraq, he would violate the law.
First Lieutenant Ehren Watada, of the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, at
Fort Lewis, Washington, submitted his resignation and refused to deploy to Iraq:
“Simply put, I am wholeheartedly opposed to the continued war in Iraq, the de-
ception used to wage this war, and the lawlessness that has pervaded every aspect
of our civilian leadership.” The Army subsequently denied his resignation re-
quest.19 His case, unresolved at the time of writing, is especially pertinent, be-
cause he believes that by refusing to go he is fulfilling his primary moral duty,
defending the Constitution.20
Lieutenant Watada has chosen a high-stakes moral stand, as would most
(all?) officers who face this type of situation. If subsequent legal proceedings
vindicate Watada’s claim, then he will have done his duty, perhaps the only offi-
cer to do so. Military personnel may not use obedience to orders as a defense if
the accused knew, or should have known, that the orders were unlawful.21 If
Watada is not vindicated, the legal proceedings will probably find him guilty of
desertion. Officers, having sworn to defend the Constitution, lose the privilege
to quit military service at their option and must continue to serve pending ac-
ceptance of their resignation.22 Common sense dictates that a military cannot
remain viable if its leaders may quit at any time.23
The taxonomy’s second category consists of situations in which an officer can
perform an assigned responsibility only with substantial moral discomfort. This
category includes assigned responsibilities that, although not illegal or immoral
per se, violate established policies. When I was a junior officer, a senior directed
me to expend nonappropriated funds for an item implicitly prohibited by offi-
cial instructions. Yet the item was essential for a program, the program would
benefit many, and purchase with appropriated funds was illegal. When I ex-
pressed my unease, my senior, at his own initiative, put his instruction to me in
writing. By doing so he took full responsibility for the decision and relieved my
moral distress. In subsequent years I repeatedly, in a variety of different situa-
tions, emulated and taught this example of taking responsibility.
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However extensive they may be, written policies cannot foresee or address ev-
ery contingency. The more extensive written policies are, in fact, the more likely
they are to lack internal consistency. Intentionally violating policy should make
officers uncomfortable, but they must accept responsibility for difficult choices.
Positive experiences in resolving this type of situation help to habituate the vir-
tues of prudence (of which moral awareness is a prerequisite) and courage.
A comment once made about the role of civil servants applies equally to mili-
tary officers—that they live “by an unusual code. Assuming that the government
for which he works is a constitutional one, a permanent official’s conscience
must not bleed when he is asked to carry out a policy that doesn’t fit his own
ideas. Indeed, he requires a conscience which tells him, except in extreme cir-
cumstances, to pipe down after he has had his say, and to get to work in support
even of what he thinks is wrong.”24 No officer, of any grade, who has a strong
sense of morality will likely serve for very long without being assigned a respon-
sibility to which he or she morally objects. Yet unless a situation involves grave
consequences for others or the nation, the nation rightly expects military offi-
cers to do their duty.25
An example of an issue with grave consequences would be understatements
in recent years of the amount of force and duration of time required to stabilize
Iraq. The United States today faces an international policy conundrum (devel-
oping a viable exit strategy) as the toll of wounded and killed military personnel
increases daily. In other words, General Newbold’s decision to retire clearly falls
into the third category, the type of assigned responsibility with which officers
can comply only by compromising their moral standards. General Johnson’s de-
cision to remain as Chief of Staff in spite of his objections to the president’s poli-
cies and lack of forthrightness with the public also belongs to the third category.
An example of an issue that does not meet that threshold is policy regarding
homosexuals serving in the military. Those who object to the presence of gays
and lesbians in uniform may view the policy of “don’t ask, don’t tell” as morally
wrong, but that policy does not cause grave, irreversible harm to the nation or to
military personnel. Individuals denied the privilege of serving their nation lose a
privilege, not a benefit or a right.26 Yet many on both sides of this issue under-
standably feel substantial moral discomfort in complying with a policy that they
find morally wrong. The “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy thus belongs to the second
category of moral situations.
It is impossible to demarcate definitively the line between the second and
third categories. The most important determinants of that boundary are the de-
gree and amount of harm or other evil caused by complying with an assigned re-
sponsibility. Officers of good moral character may define harms in contrary
terms—believing, for example, homosexuality wrong and therefore harmful to
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good morale versus believing it morally acceptable and therefore not a legiti-
mate basis for discrimination. Similarly, officers will often differ in their assess-
ments of likely outcomes and of the magnitude of those outcomes, such as the
number of troops and length of time required to stabilize a vanquished Iraq. For
all officers, consideration of the third category (assigned responsibilities that if
performed will cause significant compromise) requires analysis of pertinent
moral factors. What are they?
RELEVANT MORAL FACTORS
Identifying the relevant moral factors establishes a moral framework by which
an officer with an assigned responsibility from the third category can select an
appropriate course of action. Careful reflection can also help clarify whether the
issue truly belongs to the third category or in fact belongs only to the second.
Aristotle maintained that ethics have a single goal, eudaimonia.27 This Greek
word is usually translated as “happiness” but is better rendered as “well-being” or
“flourishing.”28 The prominent twentieth-century philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre
recognized that an individual’s sitz im leben—situation or setting in life, which
he terms practices—defines that teleological aim.29 For military officers, the
commissioning oath clearly states that telos, or goal. Officers swear or affirm “to
support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic.”30 The officer’s duty is to defend the Constitution, not to
advance her or his career, support a political ideology, or achieve any other pur-
pose. The oath has no fine print, no subclauses, as the remainder of the oath em-
phasizes. Some may interpret that straightforward declaration as a rule.31 In fact,
however, the oath constitutes a broad, overarching declaration of the telos of an
officer’s military service.
Fulfilling that moral purpose is especially important when matters of life and
limb are involved. Enlisted personnel, who numerically suffer the most combat
casualties, swear to obey the orders of those appointed over them.32 Officers are
the uniformed leaders of the armed services. Their responsibility “is to give
voice to those who can’t—or don’t have the opportunity to—speak.”33
The character traits or virtues conducive to performing the duty to defend
the Constitution constitute a framework for determining an officer’s duty in any
specific situation. MacIntyre’s definition of virtue makes this clear: “A virtue is
an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable
us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which
effectively prevents us from achieving any such goals.”34 Focusing on virtue
avoids the temptation to allow the end to justify the means;35 recognizes that
most ethical behavior is the result of habit rather than choice;36 and includes an
affective as well as rational component of ethical behavior.37
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One military ethicist has proposed that the relevant virtues for an officer liv-
ing out the telos of the commissioning oath are the services’ core values.38 How-
ever, as the four services have different core values, this approach unnecessarily
complicates any general discussion.
A longtime professor of military ethics at the Air War College, James Toner,
relying on a virtue ethics approach for his wide-ranging discussion of military
ethics, singles out the four virtues of prudence, justice, courage, and temperance
as the most important for military officers.39 Three of those virtues—prudence,
courage, and temperance—are, as discussed below, of critical value in helping
officers identify and do their duty. However, the virtue of loyalty is arguably
more important than the virtue of justice for the officer who has moral objec-
tions to an assigned responsibility.40
Obviously, moral officers need the virtue of justice.41 Officers allocate re-
sources, administer discipline (rewards and punishment), assign responsibili-
ties, and perform other tasks in which the virtue of justice bears directly on
performance. Without justice, it is impossible to sustain good morale and main-
tain fidelity to the Constitution. For instance, the constitutional requirement for
equal treatment under the law differs between civilian and military but should
be consistent for all personnel in each category, regardless of race, religion, etc.
Yet for the military officer facing a morally objectionable assigned responsi-
bility, loyalty supersedes justice. The officer has sworn to defend the Constitu-
tion, whether or not the Constitution is just. Before dismissing that statement as
trivial, consider the ongoing debates over abortion and capital punishment. The
Supreme Court has declared both abortion and capital punishment constitu-
tional.42 Many loyal American citizens sharply disagree with the Court, strongly
believing one or both of those acts unjust. But whatever an officer thinks about
the morality of abortion or capital punishment, the officer has sworn to defend
the Constitution. Similarly, the nation may fight an unjust war. Michael Walzer
has suggested that the U.S. invasion of Cuba in 1898 was unjust.43 Yet the mili-
tary officer (all male, at the time) who received a legal order to fight that war had
no recourse but to do his duty and go fight. To refuse to go before one’s resigna-
tion was accepted constituted desertion and an indirect attack upon, rather than
defense of, the Constitution.44 That has not changed. Unless vindicated by cur-
rent legal proceedings, this is the position in which First Lieutenant Watada will
find himself.
Loyalty to the Constitution takes precedence over justice also in dealing with
subordinates. Since an officer’s primary moral obligation is to defend the Con-
stitution, results matter. Repeatedly relying upon the same individual or unit to
accomplish the most dangerous and difficult missions may be unjust; that per-
son will suffer the most hardship and risk and that unit probably the most
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casualties. Yet repeated assignments may be essential if officers are to fulfill their
duty to defend the Constitution.
Prudence, loyalty, courage, and temperance are thus the four most important
virtues for military officers facing assigned responsibilities with which they
morally disagree. The discussion that follows of these virtues focuses on aspects
relevant to whether an officer should depart in protest.
Prudence is practical wisdom; prudence “not only helps us to be of good
counsel, but also to judge and command well.”45 The virtue of prudence encom-
passes the wisdom to recognize and classify a moral challenge (cf. the preceding
section of this article), discern the moral issues involved (explored in this sec-
tion), and develop an appropriate response to that challenge (the article’s next
section).46
The virtue of prudence is a sine qua non for military officers who would per-
form their duty to defend the Constitution. One critical aspect of prudence is
the ability of an individual to recognize her or his own blind spots. For example,
leaders during war may have so much personally invested in victory that they
cannot see factors that make victory unachievable.
Military officers develop the virtue of prudence, which Aristotle classifies as
an intellectual virtue, through experience, moral development, and
mentoring.47 The specifics of prudential wisdom vary according to the specific
situation an officer faces. Reading this article, for instance, enhances moral de-
velopment by focusing attention on categories of situations in which a protest
departure may be justified, the moral issues pertinent to protest departures, and
the experiences of officers who found themselves in morally problematic situa-
tions. Discussing the article’s contents with other officers would afford opportu-
nity for mentoring.
Loyalty has already been defended as a primary virtue for military officers
facing a moral situation that may warrant a protest departure. Two aspects of
loyalty require consideration. First, to whom or what is loyalty due? Second, if
loyalty is due to more than one entity in the same moment, what is the proper hier-
archy of those loyalties? The first of those questions is the easier to answer: loy-
alty is due to the Constitution and to one’s seniors, peers, subordinates, and self.
Although an officer’s loyalties also extend to family, friends, allies, fellow citi-
zens, etc., these are of secondary importance for this discussion, since the previ-
ous categories subsume them: loyalty to self encompasses loyalty to friends and
family, loyalty to the Constitution embraces loyalty to citizens, and so on.
The second question—establishing the proper hierarchy of loyalties—is
much more problematic. Loyalty to the Constitution always takes priority over
other loyalties. The Constitution and the nation are synonymous for the mili-
tary officer, as the Constitution defines the nation. Clarity on this point ensures
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the preservation of our democratic republic and prevents the emergence of any
form of monarchy or oligarchy through misdirected loyalty of officers to the ex-
ecutive, legislative, or judicial branches of government.
Fletcher Knebel’s widely read 1962 novel Seven Days in May suggests what to
most seems impossible, an attempted military coup in the United States.48 In the
novel, an officer whose loyalty to the Constitution remained his first priority
averted that crisis. Four decades later, however, in an era of a military commu-
nity that finds its values at odds with those prevailing in society, an era of grow-
ing careerism, and an era in which fear of terrorism is for many more potent
than the defense of freedom, to dismiss cavalierly the possibility of a military
coup seems imprudent.49 Emphasizing that a military officer’s first and para-
mount loyalty is to the Constitution, to defend it against all enemies foreign and
domestic, erects a bulwark that safeguards democracy.
But what of other loyalties? Loyalty to seniors is presumed to follow close be-
hind in the hierarchy of a military officer’s loyalties. The seemingly omnipresent
“chain of command” photos found on walls and bulkheads in all military com-
mands symbolize this presumption. A military officer’s seniors, if military offi-
cers themselves, share the duty to defend the Constitution. If civilian, they
occupy posts created by authority of the Constitution, which established civilian
control of the military and identified the president as commander in chief.50 But
no officer can abdicate personal moral responsibility.51 For example, as previ-
ously noted, no officer (or enlisted person, for that matter) can claim that he or
she was simply obeying orders as a defense in a war crimes trial.52 An illegal order
must be disobeyed (this is the fourth category of the fourfold taxonomy of
moral situations that an officer may face). Loyalty to the Constitution therefore
always takes precedence over loyalty to seniors.
There are even situations in which loyalty to subordinates must take prece-
dence over—or redefine the meaning of—loyalty to seniors. This is particularly
difficult when the senior is a civilian:
The challenge is always to acknowledge and respect two competing considerations:
the genuine expertise of trained military professionals and the need to ensure that
their professional military advice is solicited and heard; and the vital concern to
guard against the military’s making claims to expertise that properly lies beyond the
scope of military advice and encroaches on political expertise and authority.53
For example, one lesson from the Vietnam War was that civilian control of
the military should not extend to the tactical level.54 The military professional’s
expertise embraces the requirements and costs of waging war, the conditions for
waging war successfully, etc.55 General Newbold and other senior military offi-
cers brought this expertise to the table during the planning of the Iraq war;
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civilian leaders like Secretary Rumsfeld, in spite of his long tenure, arguably
lacked this expertise. Loyalty to seniors and to subordinates demanded that
General Newbold as JCS operations director speak candidly in advising his civil-
ian seniors about a war that he believed was not only unnecessary but that they
planned to wage in a manner that would result in unnecessary and avoidable ca-
sualties among U.S. armed forces.56
Genuine loyalty requires speaking the truth, as one understands it, in a timely,
direct, and appropriate manner. If an officer fully believes his or her opinion to
be the truth and of such importance that it demands a hearing, then the officer is
morally obligated to do everything possible to ensure being heard. Admittedly,
truth can be elusive, especially when dealing with predictions of the future.
“Opinion” better denotes my meaning, but it fails to convey the degree of confi-
dence and significance that an officer in such a situation must attach to it before
placing loyalty to subordinates above loyalty to seniors.
Loyalty to self and loyalty to peers, then, both fall always below loyalty to the
Constitution and usually below loyalty to seniors and subordinates. The profes-
sion of arms is rightly described as service to the nation; the term “armed ser-
vices” explicitly recognizes this characteristic of an officer’s profession. Service,
by its very nature, requires subordinating the servant’s interests to the master’s.
Martin Cook, in fact, describes military service as an unlimited liability contract.57
Under the terms of this unlimited liability contract, officers may have to go into
harm’s way, perhaps even die, in the course of their duty. Less recognized are the
smaller, more routine, and more frequent sacrifices that result from being told
where to work, assigned what to do, dispatched on lengthy deployments, etc.
Careerists are officers who consistently place self ahead of other loyalties.
Courtney Massengale, one of two protagonists in Anton Myrer’s novel Once an
Eagle, exemplifies a careerist.58 Careerism is an unhealthy form of egoism that
values the self above all else, an approach to ethics that is incompatible with the
service and sacrifice inherent in the profession of arms. Unfortunately,
careerism seems increasingly prevalent: “‘The officer corps is willing to sacrifice
their lives for their country, but not their careers,’ said one combat veteran who
says the Pentagon’s civilian leadership made serious mistakes in Iraq, but has de-
clined to voice his concerns for attribution.”59
There are occasions on which loyalty to self appropriately takes precedence,
such as when a senior is never satisfied with a subordinate’s effort or perfor-
mance or demands that the subordinate sacrifice all aspects of personal life to
perform non-mission-essential duties. Martyrdom, to be worthwhile, must
achieve something meaningful.
Several factors often masquerade as loyalty. Officers, for example, may be told
that they must “go along to get along”—that is, comply with that which does not
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fully meet standards in order to maintain positive peer relationships. This is not
genuine loyalty but pressure to be complicit in others’ failure to do their duty. An
appeal to loyalty may disguise an appeal to expediency (nobody will notice that
not all the checks were made this one time) or mutual self-protection (don’t re-
port me late for duty and I won’t report you if you’re ever late yourself). Such ap-
peals always demand that loyalty to peers take precedence over loyalty to seniors
or to one’s duty to the Constitution.
Conversely, doing one’s duty can be carried to an extreme. A subordinate who
for the first time in three years of working for the same senior is twenty seconds
late for muster or (except perhaps in recruit training or a ceremonial unit) has
inadequately polished shoes does not need reprimanding. Those shortcomings
may be inadvertent or may, as part of a larger picture, point to unhealthy stress-
ors in the subordinate’s life. Good leadership prudentially applies rules and reg-
ulations in a way that is fully consistent with doing one’s duty. Nobody would
choose to serve with an officer who lacked loyalty to subordinates or peers. But
that loyalty must always be understood within the broader perspective of loyalty
to seniors and an officer’s teleological duty to the Constitution.
Seniors occasionally demand excessive loyalty from subordinates. Such de-
mands tend to cascade down the chain of command. For example, even as Gen-
eral Tommy Franks, as Commander, U.S. Central Command, was obsequious
toward Secretary Rumsfeld, so also General Franks demanded that same kind of
loyalty from his subordinates.60 This has the unintended consequence of depriv-
ing all levels of healthy dissent and denies the senior the opportunity to capital-
ize on the perspective and wisdom of the entire staff. One of five errors in the
2003 Iraq war that Gordon and Trainor identify was that President George W.
Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld “presided over a system in which differing military
and political perspectives were discouraged.”61 In contrast, General Henry
Shelton, in his tour as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wanted unvarnished
opinions and insisted that service chiefs and commanders read McMaster’s Der-
eliction of Duty. The secretary of defense at the time, William Cohen, echoed
Shelton’s sentiment.62
In sum, loyalty, like the Aristotelian moral virtues other than justice, consti-
tutes a situationally defined mean between two extremes.63 For loyalty, the two
extremes are excessive devotion and priggishness. An officer who fails to report a
peer’s felonious behavior displays excessive devotion. An officer obsessively fo-
cused on duty, unable to overlook any human foible or forgive any error, per-
forms priggishly. Neither extreme makes for a good officer who appropriately
balances, on the one hand, loyalty to peers and self with, on the other hand, loy-
alty to seniors and duty.
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Achieving the right balance is a continual challenge. Cheating scandals at the var-
ious service academies have consistently revealed students who were aware of the
cheating but failed to act to stop it. Their inaction magnified the scope of the scan-
dals, illustrating some of the negative consequences of excessive devotion. Too many
valiant officers in World War I tragically incarnated Tennyson’s words “Theirs not
to make reply, Theirs not to reason why; Theirs but to do and die,” priggishly lead-
ing their troops in hopeless assaults on enemy lines.64 Those officers were disloyal
to their subordinates, wasting thousands of lives in futile assaults. The virtue of
loyalty, shaped by the telos of duty, must be complemented by the virtues not only
of prudence (knowing when and how to object to an order) but of courage.65
Courage is “character in action; it is a pattern.”66 Identifying the best moral
option (the function of prudence) is insufficient for a moral life. One must act
on that information to select and then to live out the identified option. Courage
is the essential virtue for doing this.
Aristotle described virtue as intentional habits. If a person acts in the morally
correct manner yet without any awareness of what he or she is doing, the act,
though morally correct, is not virtuous. Virtue requires that a person cultivate
the habit of intentionally making the right choice.67
With respect to courage, the right choice is the mean between the extremes of
rashness and cowardice.68 The rash act is an act that is made without reflection,
may have little or no chance of success, and confers no virtue upon the doer. Col-
onel George Armstrong Custer’s braggadocio that resulted in the massacre of
the 7th Cavalry at the Little Big Horn illustrates rashness, not courage.69 General
George B. McClellan’s reluctance, when he commanded the Army of the Potomac,
to engage Confederate forces in battle illustrates cowardice in command; al-
though personally brave, he was unwilling to risk his command, his reputation,
or his troops in combat.70
Recent examples of senior officers misjudging the mean between rashness
and cowardice are instructive.71 Robert Timberg in his analysis of the Iran-Contra
scandal of the 1980s contends that the Naval Academy training that had helped
Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North (of the National Security Council staff), Robert
McFarlane (the president’s national security adviser, 1983–85), and John
Poindexter (McFarlane’s successor) achieve positions of power in the Ronald
Reagan administration was also responsible for their acts that led to criminal
charges. In each case, the officer’s threshold for resigning was too high for his
good as well as the good of the nation.72
General Zinni takes an even less charitable view toward senior officers, be-
lieving that the military services are “broken,” because senior officers place ca-
reer ahead of duty. He cites former General Shinseki’s fate as the price of candor.
Secretary Rumsfeld publicly criticized him for testifying before Congress that
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Iraq operations would require several hundred thousand troops and then
marginalized the general by announcing his successor a year early.73 That hap-
pened in spite of a long-standing custom that calls upon senior officers to give
their opinions, if specifically asked, during testimony before Congress.74 In a
New York Times op-ed, General Eaton wrote of Shinseki’s punishment, “The rest
of the senior brass got the message, and nobody has complained since.”75 Against
this backdrop, the generals who have called for Rumsfeld’s resignation have
thereby evidenced considerable courage.
If General Zinni is correct, if many military officers no longer have the capac-
ity to exercise moral courage, officer education and training require major re-
vamping. Officers must be able to discern when assigned responsibilities
conflict with their duty—the virtue of prudence. Having done so, an officer, of
any grade, must act on that conviction—the virtue of courage. If virtues are in-
tentional habits, effective change in officer education and training will require
an emphasis on how officers form habits of identifying and protesting assigned
responsibilities with which they have significant moral disagreement. Effective
change will focus also on the virtue of temperance.
Temperance was defined by Aristotle as the mean between insensibility (defi-
ciency of pleasure) and self-indulgence (an excess of pleasure). Aristotle con-
fined his definition of temperance to bodily pleasures, writing in terms of
sensation and touch.76 However, broadening the definition of pleasure to in-
clude all forms of pleasure, physical and otherwise, helpfully expands his defini-
tion.77 In that larger sense, officers with assigned responsibilities that will cause
them to make moral compromises should carefully examine their motives for,
respectively, staying on active duty and departing in protest.
Obviously, some decisions require an immediate choice, and, as already
noted, most moral behavior is reflexive, habitual.78 Situations in which one must
consider whether or not to request a principled departure generally afford time
for careful reflection. The infamous 1973 “Saturday night massacre” that ensued
when Attorney General Elliot Richardson, followed by his deputy William
Ruckelshaus, refused President Richard Nixon’s directive to fire special prosecu-
tor Archibald Cox may appear to be an exception to this generalization. In fact,
however, although Richardson and Ruckelshaus both “resigned,” they had
served at the pleasure of the president who demanded their resignation. In plain
language, the president effectively fired them both, because they refused to obey
his directive.79
Military officers are unlikely to find themselves in a similar situation, receiv-
ing morally odious orders of questionable legality that require immediate exe-
cution. In any case, the forward-thinking officer generally knows the options on
the table, allowing him or her time to consider an appropriate response before
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receiving an order. Orders that, as is extremely improbable, arrive without fore-
warning, demand immediate execution, and are morally odious are likely to be
patently illegal as well.
Self-examination takes time, is most effective when habitual, yet is an essen-
tial habit for military officers to cultivate. Moral officers will habitually assess
whether their primary motive in responding to a morally objectionable assigned
responsibility of any type is:
• Career advancement (the excess of self-indulgence)
• Doing their duty, a duty that appropriately recognizes and balances various
loyalties, including loyalty to self (the mean of temperance)
• Self-effacing martyrdom that totally devalues the officer and the officer’s
career (the excess of insensibility).
Decisions to depart (request reassignment, retire, or resign) are usually costly.
They invest all of an officer’s credibility in a single attempt to influence policy.
Others, even those who share the officer’s moral views, are unlikely to continue
to regard the officer as a team player. The armed services in this respect are prob-
ably no different from political parties or large corporations.80 Senior leaders
usually select their own “teams.” Many seniors not surprisingly prefer players
who subordinate ethical autonomy to team loyalty.81 A decision to depart the
military community, especially by the incumbent of a senior position, may pre-
clude future employment options in defense-related fields.82
Officers in a pay grade between O1 and O6, in a lower-profile position, typi-
cally communicate their reasons for departing to the relevant decision makers in
a formal but nonpublic way, as via a letter of resignation or request for reassign-
ment. In this case, the cost may be mainly financial, impacting future employ-
ment options only minimally. However, resigning after ten or more years of
service in a system that does not vest pension benefits until retirement eligibility
can entail a substantial financial disadvantage.83 Requesting a reassignment gen-
erally ends an officer’s hope for promotion, eliminates raises tied to promotion,
and perhaps forces the officer to leave active duty because of “high year tenure”
policies (a requirement to leave the service by a certain point if not promoted).
The circumstances of none of the three departure options are entirely under
an officer’s control. Years of service, remaining obligated service, time in grade,
time on station, and billet held may limit an officer’s options.84 Those factors
tend to effect junior officers more than senior officers. Further, all requests for
transfer, resignation, and retirement require approval. Approval is not auto-
matic, and the process often takes months to complete. Meanwhile, the officer
must remain in situ until otherwise directed.
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Officers of all grades must carefully consider their motives for deciding to de-
part in protest. The graver the choice, the larger and broader the consequences,
the more irreparable the potential damage, the greater is the need for moral
firmness rather than flexibility. Semper Gumby (“always flexible”), although ap-
propriate in some military situations, is the hallmark, if employed as a moral
descriptor, of the self-indulgent and thus a recipe for moral malaise rather than
rectitude. Lifelong cultivation of the virtues of prudence, loyalty, courage, and
temperance lived out under the teleological penumbra of doing one’s duty to de-
fend the Constitution represents an officer’s best preparation for constructively
facing a morally problematic assigned responsibility.
REVIEWING THE OPTIONS
An officer confronting a moral situation belonging to the third category (an as-
signed responsibility performed only at the significant compromise of one’s
moral standards) must make a decision. In each of the other three categories, the
preferable choice is clear. If the assigned responsibility causes minor moral dis-
comfort, complete the assignment anyway. If the assigned responsibility causes
substantial moral discomfort, complete the assignment while striving to effect
change from within the system. (Efforts to achieve change should not entail a
shirking of responsibility, slow execution of orders, substandard performance,
undercutting of civilian authority over the military, or any other behavior that
manifests a lack of loyalty to the officer’s primary duty to defend the Constitu-
tion.85 Morally appropriate methods to effect change emphasize providing the
cognizant authority complete, cogent analysis and forthright opinions in a
timely, tactful, and appropriate manner.) Finally, if the assigned responsibility is
one an officer must not perform, refuse to obey the order.
In responding, however, to a situation from the third, least clearly demarcated
category, an officer has four options:
1. Stay on quietly, hoping for the best, trying to resist from inside.
2. Depart quietly, physically severing one’s connection with “the team.”
3. Depart with public protest, alerting the public to the egregiousness of the
problem.
4. Try to have it all ways—first holding on for as long as possible, then depart-
ing and walking a tightrope between discreet silence and public protest.86
How does an officer choose the best option in any given situation?
Successful examples of an officer choosing the first course of action—staying
on quietly and trying to resist from within—are inherently the most difficult to
identify. Publicizing an officer’s ability to effect this type of change sabotages
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that officer’s future viability as a team player and hence his or her career. Most
organizations tolerate only limited dissent and ostracize those who transgress
that boundary;87 General Shinseki, for instance, enjoyed until the end of his ca-
reer a well-deserved reputation as a team player.88
The Nobel Prize–winning German scientist Otto Hahn, who codiscovered
uranium fission in 1938, covertly arranged the escape of his Jewish collaborator
and then sabotaged the German research program to prevent the Nazis from de-
veloping a nuclear weapon.89 He is an example of someone who stayed on and
was quietly effective from within the system. However, an important distinction
between Hahn’s situation and that of most U.S. military officers needs highlight-
ing. The Nazis sought to implement a policy that was patently immoral and ille-
gal. Further, unlike in the United States, the German legal system offered no
avenue of redress. If an American military officer, in contrast, believes an order
patently immoral and illegal, then that officer, like Lieutenant Watada, should
refuse to obey and then rely on the legal process for vindication. An officer who
chooses to remain in the U.S. armed forces and seek change from within cannot
morally seek to subvert policy established by legitimate authority. The officer’s
moral duty at that point includes loyal obedience to orders.90 The officer must
seek change only in morally sound ways. The paucity of such approaches has
historically rendered the option only rarely effective.
Robert McNamara, who as secretary of defense grew increasingly disillu-
sioned about the Vietnam War yet did not resign in protest, is an example of opt-
ing to work for change from within and failing. McNamara found himself
gradually stripped of power and then, abruptly, president of the World Bank.91
General Harold Johnson’s failed attempt to effect change from within has been
noted.
For many officers, the first option—stay on and resist the policy from
within—is often the most tempting, as officers generally are loyal team players
who believe that they can make a difference.92 The longer officers serve, the more
likely they are to identify themselves with the institution of the armed services,
becoming ever more heavily invested in preserving, protecting, and promoting
it.93 Flag and general officers may also believe that a new administration will
change, or create the potential for changing, an objectionable policy and that ac-
cordingly, by remaining, they will have influence in the future.94 As with any pre-
diction, those calculations may be inaccurate. Parallel with but distinct from
those laudatory goals are an officer’s own career ambitions that promote com-
mitment to the team. Also, the institution inculcates in officers with a deficiency
of self-esteem a paternal-like dependency that binds them to the team.
The fourfold delineation ignores a fifth option: do nothing. Perhaps that
should have been included. However, in an institution that prizes moral
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behavior as much the U.S. armed services claim to, an officer should do some-
thing when assigned a responsibility that may compromise his or her moral
standards. As a moral minimum, the officer should quietly seek to effect change
from within the system. Nothing less is acceptable, given that an officer’s pri-
mary moral aim is to defend the Constitution against all enemies foreign and
domestic. For the officer whose moral standards align with the telos of duty and
the virtues of prudence, courage, temperance, and loyalty, any assigned respon-
sibility that compromises those standards implicitly represents an attack on the
Constitution, whether by a diminution of its vision for the nation or a more
frontal assault on its provisions.95
Only the naive would assume that no officer ever opts to do less than the
moral minimum. Lieutenant General Newbold commented upon such officers
in his Time column:
Flaws in our civilians are one thing; the failure of the Pentagon’s military leaders is
quite another. Those are men who know the hard consequences of war but, with few
exceptions, acted timidly when their voices urgently needed to be heard. When they
knew the plan was flawed, saw intelligence distorted to justify a rationale for war, or
witnessed arrogant micromanagement that at times crippled the military’s effective-
ness, many leaders who wore the uniform chose inaction. A few of the most senior
officers actually supported the logic for war. Others were simply intimidated, while
still others must have believed that the principle of obedience does not allow for re-
spectful dissent.96
If General Newbold’s assessment is correct, these officers are sadly deficient in
prudence, courage, temperance, or all three. At a minimum, the officer who can-
not comply with an assigned responsibility without significant moral compro-
mise must either attempt to effect change in a morally appropriate manner or
depart.
The second option, departing quietly, physically severs one’s connection with
“the team.” The act of leaving, absent an explanation connected to the moral dif-
ficulty, is unlikely to change anything other than the personnel roster. This does
nothing to rectify what the officer believed to be a serious moral problem; leav-
ing quietly simply passes the responsibility to another officer, who will then face
the same moral choices. General Newbold’s decision to retire in 2002 exempli-
fies the inadequacy of this option. His departure caused no waves and appar-
ently did not prompt a reexamination of the policies and plans with which he so
vehemently disagreed.
The most important exception to that generalization arises when an officer
has individual moral objections, not shared by all, to a particular assigned re-
sponsibility. “Individual moral objections” connotes objections rooted in values
unrelated to the military officer as a professional. For example, some religious
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faiths, for moral reasons, have stringent dietary restrictions; other faiths are
completely pacifist. Officers who commit themselves to such faiths will often
find that commitment incompatible with continued military service. In that
case, leaving quietly is the appropriate moral choice in this nation, whose consti-
tution guarantees a plural, secular culture.97
The officer’s third choice is to leave in public protest, drawing wide attention
to an egregious moral problem. The best opportunity to communicate one’s rea-
sons for departing and, for those reasons, to influence policy is immediately fol-
lowing one’s departure.98 The short attention span of the media and their
continuing requirement for new news drive this demand for immediacy.
Waiting months or years tends to diminish the amount of media attention any
pronouncement will receive, as well as its impact. The attention that Lieutenant
General Newbold’s column received four years after his departure represents an
exception to the first part of this generalization. However, by waiting four years
General Newbold abandoned the possibility that speaking out could change the
policies and plans that caused him to depart. If his criticisms are correct, Ameri-
cans now live with the consequences of those policies and plans: an invading
force that was allegedly poorly prepared for the tasks of occupation and stabili-
zation, resulting in avoidable casualties on all sides and a potentially failed pol-
icy. Nobody can know what might have happened had General Newbold
publicly voiced his concerns at the time of his retirement.
Incumbents of high-profile positions (most officers in pay grade O7 and
above, some in command, recipients of unusual media attention, etc.) are likely
to see any departure request speedily approved. Leaders want all of their team
members to be highly motivated and supportive of the leader’s goals; teams
comprising high-profile positions are likely to have a powerful team leader who
can push the system to respond. Thus Lieutenant General Newbold, Director of
Operations of the Joint Staff in 2002, is likely to have had little difficulty in mak-
ing a reasonably quick exit, allowing him to present his reasons for departing to
the public in a timely fashion.
Mackubin Owens notes that no policy forbids or discourages retired flag and
general officers from publicly voicing their opinions. However, he thinks the
public unlikely to distinguish between active-duty and retired flag/general offi-
cers and worries that retirees speaking out may encourage active-duty officers to
undercut policy or to believe that the military has the right to insist that civilian
leaders accept the military’s policy prescriptions.99 The long, honorable parade,
which began with George Washington, of retired generals and admirals subse-
quently elected as civilian leaders illustrates the military’s fundamental loyalty
to the constitutional cornerstone of civilian control of the military, a retired offi-
cer’s ability morally to juggle multiple roles, and the electorate’s appreciation of
C L I F F O R D 1 2 1
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Winter 2007.vp
Wednesday, February 28, 2007 8:14:47 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
19
Clifford: Duty at All Costs
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2007
both of those realities. Preventing or discouraging retired officers, especially se-
nior officers, from speaking out on current affairs would deprive the nation of
valuable wisdom and leadership.
Personnel in lower-profile positions (most officers in grades O1–O6) are gen-
erally less able to depart expeditiously, since their team leaders have less influ-
ence within the institution. The process of leaving may involve two steps:
transfer from the billet currently held to a large, nonoperational command and
then release from active duty when the officer’s formal request to resign or to re-
tire receives approval.
This difference raises a question: Whom does the officer wish to influence by
his or her departure? Those in lower-profile positions who confront responsibil-
ities that will cause them to make unacceptable moral compromises have nor-
mally been assigned them by their commanding officer, commander, or the next
higher echelon. Those seniors would invariably give close attention to a volun-
tary request for immediate transfer, which are relatively rare and usually career
ending. In such a case, the request is in effect the officer’s public statement of
protest. The formal letter of resignation that an officer must submit affords a
second opportunity to draw the chain of command’s attention to what the offi-
cer believes is an egregious moral situation.
Officers in higher-profile positions have a more difficult challenge in bring-
ing their cases before people who might be able to alter the situation. They typi-
cally enjoy much freedom with respect to day-to-day matters; issues most likely
to raise substantive moral difficulties for them will be policy decisions made by
civilian authorities, whether Congress, in the executive branch, or both. Civilian
decision makers expect external dissent and therefore tend to discount it.100 Fur-
ther, both civilian and military decision makers at the highest levels function in
an environment in which decisions result from convergence of interests and
centers of gravity. This means that officers departing from high-profile posi-
tions who wish to make their views heard must likely address multiple audiences
and do so forcefully.101
The challenges and costs of protest departures lead some officers to attempt
the fourth and most difficult exit strategy—holding on for as long as possible,
then exiting and walking a tightrope between discreet silence and public protest.
Some officers may consider a protest departure in order to provide decision
makers with the information necessary for informed debate.102 However, in the
case of military policy, the essential information (say, war plans) may be classi-
fied and therefore not disclosable, at least in a timely manner. The illegality of
disclosing vital classified information will convince some officers that the fourth
option is their only real alternative.
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Any officer contemplating a protest departure should heed two cautions.
First, the officer must carefully avoid the appearance of conflict of interest—that
is, there must be no impression given that the officer stands to profit or benefit
by departing. Otherwise, that gain, not the protest, becomes the center of atten-
tion; escaping that pitfall requires the virtue of temperance, avoiding the excess
of self-indulgence. Second, protest departures, even with optimal publicity to
appropriate decision makers, may not visibly alter policy. Departure does mean,
however, that the officer no longer has to perform a morally objectionable as-
signed responsibility. Further, a prudent and temperate officer who coura-
geously departs and who appropriately makes known the reasons for that
departure has loyally performed his or her constitutional duty in attempting to
effect change.
“I TOLD YOU SO . . .”
The three-step model developed in this article provides a useful framework for
analyzing the actions of Generals Johnson and Newbold. General Johnson rec-
ognized that he faced a situation belonging to category three of the taxonomy
delineated above—that is, a situation in which continuing to perform his as-
signed responsibility would require significant moral compromise. Time proved
him unable to effect change from within the system. Nobody will ever know if
the war in Vietnam would have ended sooner, how many fewer casualties there
might have been, and whether people would have more trust in the U.S. govern-
ment if he and the “five silent men” had resigned in protest. In retrospect his de-
cision to remain on active duty was, no matter how well intentioned, not the
morally right choice. McMaster is correct. General Johnson and his colleagues
failed to do their moral duty to defend the Constitution.
Lieutenant General Newbold, prior to retiring, clearly recognized that he too
faced such a situation. In chronological order, he:
• Recognized the situation belonged to the third category, facing assigned
responsibilities he could perform only by significantly compromising his
moral beliefs (he exercised the virtue of prudence)
• Voiced his objections to decision makers (that he did this without being
fired shows that he exercised the virtues of prudence, loyalty, courage, and
temperance)
• Retired (rejected option one, continue to work from within the system)
• Publicly, after some years, voiced his objections (chose option four, first
work from within and then from without, publicly voicing objections only
as a last resort).
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General Newbold has publicly pondered whether he should have more asser-
tively challenged views with which he disagreed.103 Given his opinions that in-
vading Iraq was unnecessary, relied on plans that would produce avoidable
casualties, and was a distraction from greater threats to national security, he was
morally deficient in not doing everything he could to prevent the war. The tim-
ing of his retirement suggests that he recognized the moral compromise he
faced. If he could have made a persuasive case against the policies and plans he
found morally objectionable without revealing classified information, then,
given the magnitude of the issues at stake, he should have chosen option three
(resign and speak out) instead of option four. That failure points to deficiencies
in one or more of these three virtues: prudence (lacked wisdom to see the full
importance of the issues at the time he resigned), courage (too timid), or tem-
perance (too concerned about his position on the team or future influence).
Waiting until after the fact to declare “I told you so, but you wouldn’t listen” is a
manifestation of unhealthy civil-military relations, a decision that lacks any
moral justification. In any event, some degree of excessive loyalty to the JCS
team, fellow officers, the Marine Corps, etc., probably blurred Newbold’s per-
ception of his constitutional duty—an inescapable consequence for all senior
officers of long service and multiple loyalties.
Officers facing difficult moral situations must perform their duty to defend
the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic, at all costs. They can
profitably use this model to chart their course as well as to learn from previous
decisions. Step one is to determine which of the four categories of moral situa-
tions an officer faces. If the situation belongs to the third category, a situation in
which performing the assigned responsibility would cause an officer to make
moral compromises, the officer should take step two and consider the situation
from the perspective of the relevant moral factors: the aim to defend the Consti-
tution as shaped by the virtues of prudence, loyalty, courage, and temperance.
Finally, step three requires the officer to select the best course of action from one
of the four that may be morally appropriate.
Several caveats, however, are necessary. Complete information for moral de-
cision making is never available. Any ex post facto review must consider whether
the officer, given information available at the time, acted prudentially. Moral
virtues are situationally determined means between two extremes. An officer
who displays an excess or deficiency of a moral virtue may still strongly embody
that virtue in other ways. Finally, the complexities of human behavior preclude
simplistic conclusions about motives. Even extensive psychoanalysis cannot al-
ways clarify the motives or reasons behind particular actions. Nevertheless, ha-
bitual reflection on the actions of others as well as one’s own actions cultivates
moral growth and development.
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